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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter, pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 63-46(b)-16 (1988) and Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-801 (1997), to address all the 
Orders at issue in this case under Union Pacific RR Co. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 2000 
UT40,^24, 999 P.2d 17. 
ISSUES 
First Issue: Did the Labor Commission err in dismissing the Petitioner's 
death claim based upon the one year limitation period set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 34A-
2-417(3) when the petitioner failed to file a claim until more than 3 months after the 
expiration of the one year limitation period? 
Standard of Review: The standard of review applicable is the correction of 
error review. "If... the language [of the statute] is unambiguous and we can interpret 
and apply the statutory language by the traditional methods of statutory construction, 
utilizing our own expertise to decide the legislative intent, we review the agency action 
under section 63-46b-16(4)(d) for correction of error." King v. Industrial Com'n of Utah, 
850 P.2d 1281, 1291 (Ut. Ct. App. 1993). 
Second Issue: Is Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-417(3) unconstitutional on its 
face or as applied? 
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Standard of Review: Because the Utah Labor Commission is not a court of 
general jurisdiction, it lacks authority to address the constitutionality of a statute. Avis v. 
Board of Review. 837 P.2d 584, 586 (Utah App. 1992). Generally, correction of error 
applies to constitutional issues when they have been addressed below. Grand County v. 
Emery County. 2002 UT 57. 57 P.3d 1148. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, 
ORDINANCES, RULES AND REGULATIONS 
The following statutes and rules are determinative in this appeal: 
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-407(5)(b) 
The employer shall file the report required by Subsection (5)(a) within seven days 
after: 
(I) the occurrence of a fatality or injury; 
(ii) the employer's first knowledge of the fatality or injury; or 
(iii) the employee's notification of the fatality or injury. 
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-407(6) 
An employer required to file a report under Subsection (5) shall provide the 
employee with: 
(a) a copy of the report submitted to the division; and 
(b) a statement, as prepared by the division, of the employee's rights and 
responsibilities related to the industrial injury, (emphasis added). 
2 
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-417(3) 
A claim for death benefits is barred unless an application for hearing is filed within 
one year of the date of death of the employee. 
Utah Administrative Code R612-1-7 
Upon receiving a claim for workers' compensation benefits, the insurance carrier 
or self-insured employer shall promptly investigate the claim and begin payment of 
compensation within 21 days from the date of notification of a valid claim or the 
insurance carrier or self-insured employer shall send the claimant and the division written 
notice on a division form or letter containing similar information, within 21 days of 
notification, that further investigation is needed stating the reason(s) for further 
investigation. Each insurance carrier or self-insured employer shall complete its 
investigation within 45 days of receipt of the claim and shall commence the payment of 
benefits or notify the claimant and division in writing that the claim is denied and the 
reason(s) why the claim is being denied. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This appeal concerns a workers' compensation claim for death benefits. On 
January 26, 2002, Henning Sven Jensen died while driving a truck for his employer, 
Diamond Express, LLC on Interstate 90 near Butte, Montana. Record at 1-2, 4-9. On or 
about March 8, 2002, Truck Insurance Exchange issued a written denial of workers' 
compensation benefits to Vivian Jensen (the "petitioner"), spouse of Henning Sven 
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Jensen, based upon the information contained in Mr. Jensen's death certificate and police 
report which indicated that "heart attack" was the cause of death. Record at 27. 
At about the time of the denial on March 8, 2002, the petitioner was offered and 
accepted legal representation related to her workers' compensation claim and other 
possible claims. Record at 51. On October 31, 2002, the petitioner was notified by her 
attorneys that they had decided not to continue representing her with respect to her 
claims. Record at 51. Based upon statements of her attorneys at that time, the petitioner 
understood that she had no less than two years, and possibly longer, after the date of her 
husband's death to proceed with her claim. Record at 52. 
The petitioner eventually retained H. Dennis Piercey as legal counsel with respect 
to her claims and on May 5, 2003, more than one year and three months after the date of 
Henning Sven Jensen's death, the petitioner filed a Claim for Dependent's Benefits 
and/or Burial Benefits. Record at 1. On June 6, 2003, the respondents filed an Answer 
affirmatively alleging that Mr. Jensen died as a result of a non-industrial heart attack and 
affirmatively alleging that the petitioner failed to timely file a claim for death benefits 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-417(3), based upon the fact that the Claim for 
Dependent's Benefits and/or Burial Benefits was filed more than one year from the date 
of death of the deceased. Record at 44-48. 
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On July 11, 2003, the respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss on the basis that the 
petitioner's claim for death benefits is barred pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-417(3) 
for failure to file the claim with the Labor Commission within one year. Record at 19-25. 
On September 29, 2003, the petitioner filed a Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to 
Dismiss and conceded that the claim for benefits was not filed until approximately one 
year and three months after the death of her husband. Record at 30. However, the 
petitioner argued that such failure to file within the one-year statute of limitations period 
should be excused based upon the following contentions: (1) the employer/carrier should 
have provided the petitioner with additional documentation and advice regarding her 
claims and the statute of limitations; (2) the petitioner's prior counsel failed to prosecute 
her claims and failed to properly advise her of the statute of limitations; and (3) the one-
year statute of limitations is unconstitutional. Record at 30-49. 
On October 2, 2003, Judge Debbie L. Hann issued an Order of Dismissal, wherein 
she concluded that the petitioner's claim must be dismissed because it was not filed 
within one year of the date of death as required by Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-417(3). 
Record at 60-61. On October 27, 2003, the petitioner filed a Motion for Review. Record 
at 63. On November 13, 2003, Judge Hann signed an Order granting the respondents 
until and including December 11, 2003 to file a Response to the petitioner's Motion for 
Review. Record at 78. On December 11, 2003, the respondents filed a Memorandum in 
Opposition to Motion for Review. Record at 80. 
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On April 20, 2004, the Utah Labor Commission denied petitioner's Motion for 
Review stating that the statute of limitation had run, thus barring petitioner's claims. 
Recordation 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The administrative law judge and the Labor Commission of Utah correctly 
determined that the petitioner's claim must be dismissed pursuant to her failure to file her 
claim within the one year statute period required by Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-417(3). It is 
undisputed that the petitioner failed to comply with the one year statute of limitations. 
However, the petitioner argues that the statute of limitations should be disregarded based 
upon her allegations that the respondents failed to properly assist her with her claim and 
that her prior counsel provided her with erroneous advice regarding the applicable statute 
of limitation. A careful review of the facts of this case demonstrates that the respondents 
issued a timely written denial of the petitioner's claims and set forth the factual basis for 
such denial. Record at 27. 
The respondents do not have an affirmative duty to continue to assist the petitioner 
with her claims or to provide her with legal advice regarding Utah workers' compensation 
law. The respondents gave the petitioner timely and accurate information in compliance 
with Utah's Workers' Compensation Rules. The respondents engaged in no conduct 
which contributed to the petitioner's failure to comply with the statute of limitations. 
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It is undisputed that after issuance of the denial, the petitioner quickly and 
reasonably sought and retained counsel to give her advice and with respect to her claims. 
The petitioner's prior counsel gave her erroneous information regarding the statute of 
limitations. It was the erroneous advice of counsel that caused the petitioner not to file 
her claim within the one year statutory period. The petitioner's proper remedy is to 
pursue her legal malpractice action against her prior counsel. 
Finally, petitioner's constitutional arguments against the statute of limitations set 
forth in Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-417(3) are without merit. The petitioner has presented 
no decision by any Utah court that sets forth a constitutional prohibition on the Utah 
legislature's authority and power to create such a statute of limitations. Neither can the 
petitioner supply any reason for why such a limitation violates any particular provision of 
the Utah or United States Constitutions. Therefore, the petitioner's constitutional 




The Respondents Did Not Breach Any Duty to the Petitioner and Did Not Engage In 
Any Conduct Which Would Justify the Requested "Exception to the Statute of 
Limitations." 
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-417(3) states that "[a] claim for death benefits is barred 
unless an application for hearing is filed within one year of the date of death of the 
employee." It is undisputed that the petitioner failed to comply with the one year statute 
of limitations. Therefore, the administrative law judge and the Labor Commission of 
Utah correctly determined that the petitioner's claim must be dismissed. 
In her Brief of Petitioner, the petitioner urges this Court to recognize a new 
exception to the one year statute of limitations based upon the respondents' failure to 
adequately inform the petitioner of her potential rights and responsibilities under the 
statute. Specifically, the petitioner argues that she failed to file her claim within the one 
year statute of limitations period because the respondents did not provide her with a 
statement of rights and responsibilities and because the respondents chose to issue their 
denial of the petitioner's claim on their letterhead rather than through utilization of the 
Utah Labor Commission's Form 89. 
A. Petitioner's Claim That Respondents Had a Duty to Supply Her With 
the Additional Form and Pamphlet Fails For Several Reasons. 
There are several reasons why petitioner's claim of breach of duty fails. First, 
there is no requirement in the Labor Commission rules that an employer utilize Form 89 
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for notification of a denial of the claim. Utah Administrative Code R612-1-3(E) 
references Form 89 as a form which may be used by an insurance carrier or self-insured 
employer to notify a claimant that her claim is denied and the reasons why the claim is 
denied. However, there is no requirement in the rule that such form be used. By way of 
contrast, R612-1-3 indicates that Forms 122, 221, 141, 142, 001, 025, 130, 102, 043 must 
be used pursuant to the provisions of the rules. The rules do not require the use of Form 
89 as the exclusive method of notifying a claimant of the denial of her claim. 
Second, Utah Administrative Code R612-1-7 governs the process for acceptance 
or denial of a claim. Nowhere in that rule, or any other rule, is there a requirement that an 
insurance carrier utilize Form 89 to notify a claimant of its denial of the claim. Rather, 
the rule requires either commencement of payment on the claim or denial of the claim "in 
writing" within the 45 day period. It is undisputed that the respondents notified the 
petitioner in writing of the denial of her claim along with the specific basis therefor 
within the required 45 day period. Thus, the respondents breached no duty to the 
petitioner with respect to their denial of the claim. 
Third, in denying petitioner's request for rehearing, Utah Labor Commissioner R. 
Lee Ellertson stated that Utah Administrative Code R612-1-3 does not require use of 
Form 89. (See Order Denying Motion for Review, at 2). In fact, "the Industrial 
Accidents Division has permitted use of other written forms of denial in the past." Id. 
The Labor Commission has the power to create forms to be used in the workers' 
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compensation system and has the power and discretion to determine which forms are 
required and which forms are not. The Labor Commission has determined that use of the 
Form 89 is not required. For this reason, the Labor Commission dismissed petitioner's 
argument that failure of the respondents' use of Form 89 was sufficient to create an 
exception to the one-year statute of limitations. It would be inappropriate for this Court 
to make a determination with respect to which forms created by the Labor Commission 
must be used. There is no rule or statute which requires the use of Form 89. Therefore, 
the petitioner's argument with respect to such form should be disregarded. 
Fourth, the petitioner argues that her failure to comply with the statute of 
limitations was due to the respondents' alleged failure to provide her with a statement of 
rights and responsibilities and that such statement would have prevented her from missing 
the statute of limitations deadline. Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-407(6) requires an employer 
to provide the employee with "a statement, as prepared by the division, of the employee's 
rights and responsibilities related to the industrial injury." The petitioner was not an 
employee of Diamond Express, LLC. Rather, the petitioner was the spouse of the 
deceased employee. Nothing in the language of the statute cited by the petitioner imposes 
any duty upon the employer/carrier to provide the dependents of an injured or deceased 
worker with a statement of employee's rights and responsibilities. Indeed, it would be 
inappropriate and misleading for the employer/carrier to provide the non-employee 
petitioner with such a document, which was created for injured employee workers. 
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Fifth, and perhaps most importantly, even if the petitioner had been provided with 
the document entitled "Employee's Guide to Workers' Compensation" and with Form 89, 
there is no reference in either one of those documents to a one-year statute of 
limitations. Those documents simply state that if the petitioner has any questions, the 
petitioner could call the Labor Commission for further information. Nothing in Form 89 
or the Employee's Guide would have called her attention to a one-year statute of 
limitations for filing an application for a hearing as required by Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-
417(3). In fact, the petitioner would likely have been led to believe by the Employee's 
Guide, which refers to the six-year statute of limitations for temporary total compensation 
claims, that she had a larger amount of time to file her claim. The petitioner argues 
speculatively in this appeal that this case would have had a different outcome if she had 
received a Form 89 and an Employee's guide. However, because those documents do not 
contain additional substantive information related to the petitioner's particular claims, it is 
quite likely that she would have still retained her attorney and reached the same result 
despite receipt of the document. 
The petitioner concedes on page 23 of Brief of Petitioner that the Employee's 
Guide refers to several time limitations, including the six-year limitation for temporary 
total claims, but fails to mention the one-year limitation for death benefits claims. The 
fact that the Employee's Guide makes no reference to the one-year limitation further 
supports the position of the Labor Commission that the guide is intended only for 
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employees and not for dependents of a deceased worker. If the Employee's Guide had 
been created for such dependents, it would have included the reference to the applicable 
statute of limitations for their claims. 
Finally, even if it were determined that the respondents had an obligation to 
provide the petitioner with a statement of employee's rights and responsibilities, Utah 
Code Ann. § 34A-2-407 does not contain any provisions which allow for ignoring the 
applicable statute of limitations when an employer neglects to provide an injured 
employee with such statement. The drastic and unprecedented remedy requested by the 
petitioner is not supported by the applicable statutes and should be denied and 
disregarded. 
The petitioner cites to numerous cases, mostly from other jurisdictions, to support 
the argument that the statute of limitations should be extended in this case. However, the 
cases cited by the petitioner deal with different statutory systems and none of those cases 
stand for the proposition that a statute of limitations for a workers' compensation death 
claim should be extended or tolled after an employer has timely denied a claim in writing 
in accordance with the rules of the jurisdiction. 
The petitioner cites to Fowler v. Titus Manufacturing Co., 7234 P.2d 1309 (Okla. 
App. 1986) for the proposition that a statute of limitations may be tolled based upon the 
conduct of an employer in a non-death case. In Fowler, the Oklahoma Court of Appeals 
tolled the applicable statute of limitations based upon a specific statutory provision which 
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provides for tolling of the statute of limitations if an employer neglects to advise the 
employee of his right to file a workers' compensation claim. Id Oklahoma has a specific 
statute which provides for the tolling of the statute of limitations. Thus, the Fowler case 
is useful only in demonstrating that the Oklahoma Court of Appeals adhered to the 
relevant statutes. The legislature in Utah has created no provisions regarding tolling the 
statute of limitations for failure of an employer to comply with workers' compensation 
rules and statutes. Additionally, the facts of the instant case demonstrate that the 
respondents complied with the relevant rules and statutes by sending to the petitioner a 
timely denial of the claim in writing. Therefore, the case law cited by the petitioner from 
other jurisdictions involving other statutory provisions should be disregarded as factually 
distinguishable from the instant case. 
The petitioner also cites to Reynolds v. Worker's Compensation Appeals Board. 
117 Cal.Rptr. 79, 527 P.2d 631, 632-33 (1974) in support of her argument. In Reynolds, 
the court noted the California statute which required an employer to provide an employee 
with notice that there is a possibility of workers' compensation benefits and to provide the 
employee with required language that "[i]f you wait too long, you may lose your right to 
benefits." Id. at 633. The employer in that case failed to provide the employee, as 
required by the statute, with language specifically referring to the potential for loss of 
claims through the limitations period. As a result, the court extended the period based 
upon failure to provide that required language. In the instant case, the respondents 
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complied with the relevant rules by providing the petitioner a denial in writing. Utah 
does not require that the employer provide the petitioner with any language or advice with 
respect to the applicable statutes of limitation. The Reynolds case dealt with an entirely 
different statutory scheme and should be disregarded in the resolution of the issues 
presented through the petitioner's appeal. 
The petitioner cites to Interstate Electric Co. V. Industrial Commission, 591 P.2d 
43 6, 438 (Utah 1979) for the proposition that late notice may be excused from an 
employee to an employer in a non-death case. In Interstate Electric Co., the employee 
failed to give notice to the employer of an industrial accident until three days after the 
date of the industrial accident because he thought that it was a minor injury from which 
he would quickly recover. A statute in force in 1979 stated that if an employee failed to 
notify the employer within 48 hours of the incident, the compensation would be reduced 
by 15%. The court held that the notice given one day after the expiration of the period 
did not prejudice the employer and that the 15% reduction should not be enforced. 
The facts of the instant case are quite different from the facts of Interstate Electric 
Co. In that case, the employee reported the incident within three days of the date of the 
incident. That case did not involve a death. In the instant case, the petitioner failed to file 
her claim for more than one year and three months subsequent to death of her husband. 
The petitioner had a large amount of time within which to retain counsel, to assess the 
merits of her case, and to file an Application for Hearing. The petitioner failed to take 
14 
any action until more than three months after the expiration of the limitations period. 
Therefore, her claim is barred by the statute. 
The petitioner also cites to the Utah case of van der Hevde v. First Colony 
Insurance Co.. 845 P.2d 275, 278-80 (Utah App. 1993) for the proposition that a 
defendant may be estopped from relying on a defense as a result of its own conduct. 
However, the van der Heyde case is not a workers' compensation case and does not 
involve the issue of tolling of a statute of limitations defense. That case involves a 
defendant's alleged violation of life insurance replacement regulations and has no 
application to the instant case. Additionally, the Utah Court of Appeals indicated in that 
case that estoppel requires "a statement, admission, act, or failure to act by one party that 
is inconsistent with a claim later asserted." Id at 280. The evidence in the instant case 
shows that the respondents complied with all relevant statutes and administrative rules in 
providing the petitioner with a timely denial of her claim. There is no evidence that the 
respondents made any affirmative act or that any failure to act was inconsistent with the 
petitioner's claim filed after the expiration of the one year limitations period. 
As outlined above, the cases cited by the petitioner from other jurisdictions are 
inapplicable in the instant case where the courts in those cases are construing statutes 
which are substantially different from Utah statutes. Additionally, the petitioner has not 
cited any Utah case which stands for the proposition that a statute of limitations may be 
tolled even though a defendant has complied with all relevant statutory and administrative 
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provisions. Therefore, the petitioner's arguments regarding an excusal for failure to 
comply with the statute of limitations in this case is unsupported and should be denied. 
The petitioner was made aware of the respondents' denial of her claim based upon 
the information contained in the death certificate and police report which indicated that 
her husband's "heart attack" was the cause of death. As a result, she nearly immediately 
made the reasonable determination to contact an attorney with respect to such denial. In 
retaining counsel, the petitioner was entitled to a full explanation from her attorney with 
respect to her rights and responsibilities under Utah's Workers' Compensation Act. The 
petitioner's quick retention of counsel demonstrates that the petitioner was not prejudiced 
by any conduct of the respondents. Rather, as outlined below, the petitioner was 
prejudiced solely by the conduct of her prior counsel. As such, the petitioner's remedy 
should be sought through a legal malpractice action against her prior counsel. 
As outlined above, there is no support for the petitioner's argument that the 
respondents breached any duty to the petitioner. Even if it were determined that the 
respondents breached a duty to the petitioner through failure to utilize the Form 89 and 
failure to provide the petitioner with a statement of rights and responsibilities, and that the 
petitioner was prejudiced thereby, there is no legal support for the argument that the 
petitioner's drastic remedy would be that she has the ability to file her claim at any time 
without reference to the applicable statute of limitations. R612-1-7, which governs the 
procedure for acceptance and denial of a claim, sets forth no such remedy. Additionally, 
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as the petitioner concedes on page 23 of Brief of Petitioner, the Employee's Guide refers 
to several time limitations, including the six-year limitation for temporary total claims, 
but makes no mention of the one year statute of limitations for death claims. Neither the 
Employee's Guide nor Form 89 make any reference to the one year statute of limitations. 
Therefore, there is no indication that the petitioner's receipt of such documents would 
have yielded any different result in this case. In fact, it is likely that the referral to longer 
limitations periods in the Employee's Guide would have caused the petitioner believe that 
she had a longer period than one year within which to file her claim. The petitioner has 
provided no legal support for the proposition that the alleged conduct of the respondents 
justifies ignoring an unambiguous statute of limitation. Accordingly, the petitioner's 
argument for an exception to the statute of limitations should be disregarded. 
In her Brief, the petitioner makes several unfounded and outrageous allegations as 
to the intentions of the respondents with respect to her claims. Indeed, the petitioner has 
alleged that the employer and carrier "focused their efforts on trying to get rid of the 
claim rather than on investigating it and proceeded at every turn in the way most likely to 
leave Mrs. Jensen in the dark." Brief of Petitioner at 17. Additionally, the petitioner 
refers to an "unbroken pattern of disregard for Mrs. Jensen's rights." Brief of Petitioner 
at 30. The petitioner alleges that the respondents were "electing not to preserve evidence 
directly related to the issue by requesting an autopsy." Brief of Petitioner at 22. These 
allegations are offensive, without foundation in the record, and should be disregarded. 
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The record demonstrates that the respondents complied with all relevant requirements 
under Utah law. There is no evidence that the respondents engaged in any conduct to 
deprive the petitioner of her rights. 
The record demonstrates that Mr. Jensen died on the evening of January 26, 2002. 
Record at 1-2. On January 31, 2002, within a few days of the accident, the petitioner had 
her husband's body cremated. Record at 51. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-
407(5)(b), an employer must notify the carrier and the division within seven days after the 
occurrence of a fatality. Thus, the cremation occurred even before the employer was 
required to report the incident to the insurance carrier. Additionally, all of the evidence 
as contained in the police report and coroner's report demonstrated that Mr. Jensen died 
of a heart attack. The petitioner's allegation regarding a motive of the respondents not to 
preserve evidence and order an autopsy is inappropriate, wholly without support, and 
should be disregarded especially in light of the fact that a cremation occurred before the 
employer was even required to notify the carrier of the incident. 
B. Petitioner's Reliance on Vigos v. MountainlandBuilders, Inc. For 
Support of Her Claims is Unsupported by the Facts of This Case, 
The petitioner argues that the case of Vigos v. Mountainland Builders, Inc., 993 
P.2d 207 (Utah 2000) contains support for her argument that the statue of limitations 
should be ignored in this case. In Vigos, the Utah Supreme Court held that a claim for 
permanent total disability benefits filed more than six years after the industrial incident 
was not barred by the statute of limitations because the employer/carrier originally 
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accepted the claim as compensable, paid disability benefits, and paid medical expenses 
within the six-year period. Id at 213-214. Based upon those facts, the court determined 
that the Commission had original jurisdiction over the claim prior to the expiration of the 
six-year statute of limitation period. Id. at 214. 
As Judge Hann concluded in her October 2, 2003 Order, the facts ofVigos are 
distinguishable from the instant case. In Vigos, the claim was initially accepted as 
compensable, thus invoking the continuing jurisdiction provisions of the Act. The statute 
of limitations was not disregarded in that case. Rather, the Utah Supreme Court 
determined that the Labor Commission had gained jurisdiction over the claim prior to the 
expiration of the statutory period due to the carrier's acceptance of the claim in that case. 
"Because there was no dispute over compensation or medical benefits, no Commission 
hearing was requested or necessary." Id at 212. In the instant case, the claim was denied 
and no benefits were ever paid. Therefore, the jurisdiction of the Labor Commission was 
never invoked in this case prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations period and 
the petitioner's claim was properly dismissed. 
As outlined above, it is undisputed that the respondents provided the petitioner 
with a denial of her claims within the required 45 day period and that she was made aware 
that the specific basis for such denial was that the death certificate and police report 
indicated that "heart attack" was the cause of her husband's death. It is also undisputed 
that the petitioner quickly retained counsel to assist her with her claims but that her 
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counsel failed to prosecute her claims and gave her erroneous information regarding the 
applicable statute of limitations. Further, it is undisputed that the petitioner filed her 
claim in this case more than one year subsequent to the death of her husband. The 
petitioner has provided no persuasive legal basis for ignoring the one year statute of 
limitations in this case. Under Utah law, the only exception to the one year statute of 
limitation is the tolling of the statute during the period of minority of minor dependents of 
the deceased worker. Bonneville Asphalt v. Labor Commission, 2004 UT App 137, 91 
P.3d 849. That exception is certainly not applicable in the instant case. Accordingly, 
Judge Harm's decision and the decision of Utah Labor Commissioner, R. Lee Ellertson, to 
dismiss the petitioner's claim was proper and this court should not entertain petitioner's 
claim for appeal of that decision. 
POINT II 
The Petitioner's Failure to File Her Claim Pursuant to the One-Year Statute of 
Limitations in This Case Was the Result of the Petitioner's Neglect or the Result of 
Erroneous Information Given to Her by Her Prior Legal Counsel. 
Although the petitioner argues in her brief that her failure to comply with the 
statute of limitations was the result of the conduct of the employer/carrier, the facts of this 
case, demonstrate that the petitioner's failure to file a timely Application for Hearing was 
not the result of any conduct by the respondents. As outlined above, the respondents 
complied with all applicable requirements and provided the petitioner with a timely denial 
under the rules. It is unclear why no action was taken until more than one year and three 
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months after the industrial incident. The responsibility to file a timely Application for 
Hearing clearly lies with the petitioner. It is certainly not the responsibility of an 
employer or insurance carrier to give legal advice to the spouse of a deceased 
worker-especially where that individual has retained legal counsel. The petitioner's 
claim in this appeal is essentially an attempt to shift the responsibility for compliance with 
the statute of limitations from herself to the respondents. However, it appears that the 
petitioner's failure to comply with the one-year statute of limitation was either the result 
of her own delay or was the result of incorrect legal advice given by her prior counsel. 
At about the time of the denial on March 8, 2002, the petitioner was offered and 
accepted legal representation related to her workers' compensation claim and other 
possible claims. (See Affidavit of Vivian Jensen f^ 8, Record at 52). On October 31, 
2002, the petitioner was notified by her attorneys that they had decided not to continue 
representing her with respect to her claims. (See Affidavit of Vivian Jensen % 9, Record 
at 52). Based upon statements of her attorneys at that time, the petitioner understood that 
she had no less than two years, and possibly longer, after the date of her husband's death 
to proceed with her claim.1 ( I d at f 10, Record at 52). As a result of this counsel, the 
1The petitioner now argues on page 19 of the Brief of Petitioner that the record is 
unclear as to what the petitioner was told from prior counsel. Respondents refer this 
Court to paragraph 10 of the Affidavit of Vivian Jensen which states, "Based on 
statements of my attorneys in connection with their decision not to proceed, I understood 
that I had no less than two years, and possibly longer, after the date of Henning's death to 
proceed with my claim." Record at 52. This assertion of the petitioner unambiguously 
establishes that she understood from her prior counsel that she had at least two years 
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petitioner failed to file an Application for Hearing until more than three months after the 
expiration of the one year limitation period. 
The petitioner argues that her claim should be allowed to survive the one year 
statute of limitations based upon her prior counsel's failure to proceed with her claim for 
benefits and his failure to correctly advise her of the statute of limitations. However, 
although this argument is frequently made in cases involving dismissals resulting from 
missed deadlines and statutes of limitations, courts have consistently held that failure of 
counsel does not justify reinstating claims for such missed deadlines. 
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals recently dealt with and resolved the issues 
presented by the petitioner in her Motion for Review. In Gripe v. City of Enid, 
Oklahoma. 312 F.3d 1184 (10th Cir. 2002), the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals was faced 
with the issue of whether to reinstate a plaintiffs claims, which had been dismissed due 
to the plaintiffs attorney's failure to comply with deadlines. The Tenth Circuit declined 
to reverse the judge's dismissal of the claims on that basis stating that "[a] litigant is 
bound by the actions of its attorney, and the relative innocence in the failure does not 
constitute grounds for relief." Id at 1188-89. In support of its holding, the court further 
stated: 
before the statute of limitations would run. The petitioner's new argument that the record 
is not clear as to whether her prior counsel gave incorrect advice regarding the statute of 
limitations is disingenuous and contrary to her sworn affidavit contained in the Record at 
52. 
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Plaintiff argues against the harshness of penalizing him for his attorney's 
conduct. But there is nothing novel here. Those who act through agents are 
customarily bound by their agents' mistakes. It is no different when the 
agent is an attorney. (It should be noted, however, that the mistreated client 
is not totally without a remedy. There may be a meritorious malpractice 
claim against the attorney.) Id at 1189. 
Thus, the Tenth Circuit has indicated that the appropriate remedy for a litigant whose 
attorney has missed deadlines is not revival of the dismissed claim, but a legal 
malpractice claim against the attorney. 
The United States Supreme Court has also addressed and resolved the issues raised 
by the petitioner in this appeal. In Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 82 S.Ct. 1386, 
8 L.Ed.2d 734 (1962), the Court faced the issue of whether to reinstate the plaintiffs 
claims, which had been dismissed as a result of the plaintiffs attorney's failure to comply 
with deadlines. In response to this issue, which is identical to the issues raised by the 
petitioner in this appeal, Justice Harlan indicated: 
There is certainly no merit to the contention that dismissal of petitioner's 
claim because of his counsel's unexcused conduct imposes an unjust 
penalty on the client. Petitioner voluntarily chose this attorney as his 
representative in the action, and he cannot now avoid the consequences of 
the acts or omissions of this freely selected agent. Any other notion would 
be wholly inconsistent with our system of representative litigation, in which 
each party is deemed bound by the acts of his lawyer-agent. Id. at 633-34. 
Justice Harlan further explained: 
[A] civil plaintiff may be deprived of his claim if he failed to see to it that 
his lawyer acted with dispatch in the prosecution of his lawsuit. And if an 
attorney's conduct falls substantially below what is reasonable under the 
circumstances, the client's remedy is against the attorney in a suit for 
malpractice. But keeping this suit alive merely because plaintiff should not 
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be penalized for the omissions of his own attorney would be visiting the 
sins of the plaintiffs lawyer upon the defendant. Id. at 634, n.10. 
Based upon these considerations, the United States Supreme Court held that a claimant's 
dismissed claim should not be revived based upon the failures of that claimant's attorney. 
The facts of the instant case demonstrate that the petitioner's prior counsel 
erroneously told her that she could file her claim within two years of her husband's death. 
It seems clear that it was this erroneous representation to the petitioner by her prior 
counsel that caused the petitioner not to file her claim within the one year statutory 
period. However, this issue has been addressed and resolved by the Tenth Circuit Court 
of Appeals and the United States Supreme Court. Pursuant 1o the holdings of those 
courts, a claimant's failure of counsel does not constitute justification for revival of a 
claim dismissed for failure to prosecute a claim or failure to comply with deadlines. 
Accordingly, Judge Hann's order and the order from the Utah Labor Commission 
dismissing the petitioner's claims was consistent with established law and should be 
upheld. 
POINT III 
The Petitioner's Constitutional Arguments Do Not Find Support Under Utah Law. 
The Petitioner argues that Constitutional issues need not be reached in this case 
because the Petitioner should be entitled to benefits due to failures of the employer, the 
carrier, and her prior counsel. However, the Petitioner implies in the Brief of Petitioner 
that Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-417(3) violates Utah's Open Courts Clause found in Utah 
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Const, art. I, § 11 and the uniform operation of laws provision found in Utah Const, art. I, 
§ 24. The Respondents concur with the petitioner that the Constitutional issues need not 
be reached in this case. Additionally, the petitioner has failed to offer any argument or 
case law sufficient to overcome the presumption that the one year statute of limitation is 
constitutionally valid. 
Under Utah law, a statute is presumed constitutional and reasonable doubts are 
resolved in favor of constitutionality. Utah School Boards Ass'n v. Utah State Bd. Of 
Educ. 2001 UT 2, 17 P.3d 1125; State v. DeBoov. 2000 UT 32, 996 P.2d 546 (stating 
that legislative enactments are endowed with a strong presumption of validity and will not 
be declared unconstitutional unless there is no real basis upon which they can be 
construed as conforming to constitutional requirements); Jeffs v. Stubbs, 970 P.2d 1234 
(Utah 1998)(stating that a party mounting a constitutional challenge to a law bears a 
heavy burden to overcome the presumption that the law is valid, with any reasonable 
doubts resolved in favor of constitutionality); State v. In, 2000 UT App 358, 18 P.3d 500 
(stating that when addressing a constitutional challenge to a statute, the Utah Court of 
Appeals presumes that the statute is valid and resolves any reasonable doubts in favor of 
constitutionality). 
Additionally, the Utah Supreme Court has stated that the legislature's judgment in 
fixing length of a limitations period is accorded great latitude under the provisions of the 
Utah Constitution. Lee v. Gaufin. 867 P.2d 572 (Utah 1993). With respect to statutes of 
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limitations, the Utah Court of Appeals has stated that state legislatures possess discretion 
to enact statutes of limitations, and these statutes are presumptively constitutional. Avis 
v. Board of Review of Indus. Com'n. 837 P.2d 584 (Utah App. 1992). 
The respondents emphasize that Utah appellate courts have decided that workers' 
compensation statutes of limitation do not violate the open courts provision of the Utah 
Constitution, or equal protection. See Avis v. Board of Review of the Industrial 
Commission, 837 P.2d 584 (Utah App. 1992). In Avis, the Utah Court of Appeals 
analyzed a case involving a workers' compensation statute of limitation. See Id. at 587. 
In that case, this court stated that "'a statute of limitations is constitutionally sound if it 
should allow a reasonable, not unlimited, time in which to bring suit.'" IcL (quotation 
omitted). What is to be considered a reasonable time must be decided by the legislature, 
and courts will not inquire into the wisdom of such time period unless it is manifestly so 
insufficient that the statue becomes a denial of justice. See id. Moreover, the court 
pointed out that courts have long recognized exceptions to alleviate the harsh effects of 
statutes of limitations, but those exceptions involve cases where "'plaintiffs] had no way 
of knowing the injury had occurred until after the statute had run and therefore no way of 
affixing or exploring potential liability within the statutory period.'" Id. (quotation 
omitted). Those exceptions do not apply in this case. Indeed, the petitioner was aware of 
the occurrence of the death and retained counsel to explore potential liability within the 
statutory period. 
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The petitioner argues that there can be no legitimate governmental interest for a 
one-year statute of limitations for death claims as opposed to longer limitations periods 
for different types of claims. However, death claims are quite different from other 
workers' compensation claims. A death claim has a definite and certain date of 
occurrence while other types of occupational disease and repetitive trauma claims may 
involve some ambiguity as to the date upon which the statutory period begins to run. 
When a worker dies, the interested parties become aware of that fact and can immediately 
begin to assess the claim and explore the possibility or need to pursue a claim. 
Additionally, dependents of a deceased worker are an entirely different class of 
individuals than injured workers. 
The one-year period for death claims does not involve the scenario discussed by 
the Utah Supreme Court wherein plaintiffs have no way of knowing the injury had 
occurred until after the statute had run and therefore no way of affixing or exploring 
potential liability within the statutory period. Avis, 837 P.2d at 587. Indeed, the record in 
this case clearly demonstrates that the petitioner was aware of the death of her husband 
and immediately retained counsel after receiving notification of the denial of her claim. 
There is a legitimate governmental interest in prescribing a one-year statute of limitations 
for death claims where such claims lack any ambiguity as to the date of the death. 
Additionally, the evidence demonstrates that the petitioner was aware of her husband's 
death and had ample time within the statutory period to explore potential liability. 
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Therefore, the petitioner has provided no sufficient argument or case law to demonstrate 
that the one-year statute of limitations is unconstitutional on its face or as applied. 
The petitioner cites to the recent case of Juddv. Drezga, 2004 UT 91 (November 
5, 2004) in support of her constitutional argument. In that case, the Utah Supreme Court 
dealt with the constitutionality of the medical malpractice noneconomic damages cap. 
That case makes no reference to the constitutionality of any statute of limitations and is 
inapplicable to the case at hand. 
The petitioner also cites to In re Marriage of Gonzalez, 2000 UT 28, 1 P.3d 1074 
in support of the argument that a one-year statute of limitations is too short. However, the 
one-year limitation addressed in that case which required that the determination or 
establishment of a marriage must occur during the relationship or within one year 
following the termination of that relationship. IdL At 1077. The Utah Supreme Court in 
that case declined to address the constitutional issues raised and determined that the 
statutory section only required the filing of a petition for adjudication of marriage within 
one year after the termination of the relationship. Id. at 1081. As in In re Marriage of 
Gonzalez, there is no reason for this Court to address the constitutionality of the one-year 
statute in this case, which is presumed to be constitutional. Additionally, the holding in 
that case supports the legitimacy of requiring the filing of a petition or Application for 
Hearing within a one-year period. Therefore, the petitioner's arguments regarding the 
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constitutionality of the one-year statute in this case should be disregarded and the decision 
of the Labor Commission should be affirmed. 
The petitioner has not provided any case law or argument sufficient to overcome 
the presumption of constitutionality with respect to the one year statute of limitations. 
The constitutionally valid one-year statute of limitations imposed on claims for death 
benefits pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-417(3) provides a bar to Petitioner's 
Application for Hearing and her claims were, thus, properly dismissed. 
Point IV 
The Petitioner's Argument Regarding the Merits and Substance of the Underlying 
Death Benefits Claim Should Be Disregarded Where The Labor Commission 
Dismissed the Petitioner's Claim Prior to Any Evidentiary Hearing or 
Determination on the Merits, 
In her Brief of Petitioner, the Petitioner argues that the dismissal of her claim 
should be reversed based upon the fact that her husband's death was a compensable 
industrial injury. In the Brief, the Petitioner offers highly detailed "facts" related to the 
truck accident which have never been established before the Utah Labor Commission 
because the case was dismissed for failure to comply with the statute of limitation. As 
outlined above, Mr. Jensen's death certificate and the police report from the truck 
accident indicated that "heart attack" was the cause of Mr. Jensen's death. Based upon 
that evidence, the petitioner's claim was denied. The petitioner quickly retained counsel 
and was advised by such counsel that she had two years within which to file her claim. 
29 
As a result her prior counsel's lack of familiarity with Utah law, the petitioner failed to 
file her Application for Hearing within the required period. 
Due to the fact that the petitioner failed to comply with the statute of limitation, 
her case was dismissed prior to a hearing or determination on the merits. It is 
procedurally inappropriate for the petitioner to now offer "facts" related to the truck 
accident which never became evidence or part of the record in this case and to argue that 
benefits are due. Respondents respectfully request that the petitioner's argument with 
respect to the merits of the underlying case be disregarded. The proper issue before this 
Court is whether the administrative law judge and the Utah Labor Commission correctly 
dismissed the petitioner's case where the undisputed facts demonstrated that she did not 
file her Application for Hearing until more than three months after the expiration of the 
limitation period. As outlined above, the determinations made below were consistent 
with clearly established Utah law and should be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
It is undisputed that the petitioner failed to file her Application for Hearing until 
more than three months subsequent to the expiration of the one year period set forth in 
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-417(3). As a result, the petitioner requests that this Court create 
a new exception for her failure to comply with a statute of limitations. However, the 
petitioner has not cited to any cases in Utah or any other jurisdiction to support an 
exception to a statute of limitations in a workers' compensation death case where the 
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employer/carrier has complied with all statutory requirements. The petitioner argues that 
her failure to comply with the statute of limitations was the fault of the employer for 
issuing the written notice of denial in letter form instead of using a Labor Commission 
form and for failing to give her the Employee's Guide. The petitioner speculatively 
argues that she would have somehow become aware of the one year statute of limitations 
if she had received these forms. However, as outlined above, none of the forms identified 
by the petitioner contain any reference whatsoever to a one-year statute of limitations for 
death claims. Additionally, as outlined above, there is no requirement that an employer or 
carrier use a Labor Commission form to issue a denial of a claim and there is no 
requirement to give an Employee's Guide to the spouse of a deceased worker. Thus, the 
respondents did not breach any duty to the petitioner in this case and the petitioner's 
failure to comply with the statute of limitations should not be excused. There is no 
evidence that the petitioner was improperly prejudiced in any way by the conduct of the 
respondents. In fact, the petitioner sought counsel immediately after receiving notice of 
the denial with the expectation that her retained counsel would provide her with the legal 
expertise to protect her rights. Unfortunately, the petitioner's counsel did not provide her 
with accurate advice regarding her claim. 
The undisputed facts of this case demonstrate that the petitioner's failure to 
comply with the statute of limitations was the result of either her own neglect or apathy, 
or by the erroneous advice given by her prior counsel. The petitioner relied upon her 
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counsel's representation that she had two years after the industrial incident to file an 
Application for Hearing. As outlined above, courts have consistently held that ineffective 
assistance of counsel is not a justification for disregarding a failure to comply with a 
statute of limitations. The petitioner's remedy and proper course of action is to assert a 
malpractice claim against her prior counsel. 
Additionally, the petitioner has not satisfied her burden to establish that the one 
year statute of limitation violates any particular constitutional provision on its face or as 
applied to her particular situation. The statute is presumed constitutional under Utah law 
and the petitioner has provided no legitimate basis to rebut that presumption. 
In sum, the issues raised in the Brief of Petitioner have already been decided by 
two adjudicatory bodies. Those issues do not present any ambiguity as to the application 
of the law. Therefore the determination of the Labor Commission dismissing the 
petitioner's claim should be affirmed. 
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